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Abstract: 
Before and after its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has undergone a far-reaching 
investment liberalisation. As part of this, existing restrictions on foreign ownership structure and 
mandatory export and technology transfer requirements imposed on foreign firms have been 
lifted in a number of industries. Against this background we identify the causal effects of foreign 
acquisitions on export market entry and technology take-off and evaluate whether the level of 
foreign ownership plays a role in stimulating these changes.  Using doubly robust propensity 
score reweighted bivariate probit regressions to control for the selection bias associated with 
firm level foreign acquisition incidences, we uncover strong but heterogeneous positive effects 
on export activity for all types of foreign ownership structure. We also find that minority foreign 
owned acquisition targets experience higher likelihood of R&D, providing evidence that joint 
ventures can contribute positively to China’s “science and technology take-off”.  
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1. Introduction 
There are a number of theoretical models that examine the host country welfare effects of 
foreign investment liberalisation (Markusen 2004; Egger et al., 2007; McGrattan and Prescott, 
2009). This literature has significantly enhanced our understanding of the mechanisms through 
which investment liberalisation can enhance growth. Two key mechanisms are identified in this 
respect: technological development and trade expansion. McGrattan and Prescott (2009) provide 
a theoretical analysis that shows that greater openness to FDI leads to substantial gains in the 
opening economy through the exploitation of investing countries’ technology capital.  Markusen 
(2004) predicts significant trade effects of foreign investment liberalisation, these effects being 
positive or negative depending on whether FDI is vertical or horizontal.1 
This paper contributes to this line of inquiry by evaluating the impact of foreign investment 
liberalisation on the probability that a firm enters exports markets for the first time, and the 
likelihood that a firm experiences technology take-off, which we define as engaging in R&D 
activity for the first time. We are mainly interested in analysing whether the degree of foreign 
ownership attracted by the firm plays a role in facilitating these processes. This is done by using a 
comprehensive firm level database covering enterprises in the Chinese manufacturing sector 
which allows us to identify the sub-population of firms with no exports, R&D and FDI before 
China joined the WTO in 2001. Some of these firms are subsequently partly or wholly acquired 
by foreign MNEs courtesy of investment liberalisation entailed by WTO entry, and we are able 
to trace the exporting and R&D transitions of individual firms between the pre- and post-
acquisition periods.  
Our empirical strategy exploits major changes in FDI policy following investment liberalisation 
in China. Firstly, the fact that restrictions on foreign ownership structure were lifted in a number 
                                           
1 Amiti and Wakelin (2003) take this prediction to bilateral FDI and export data, and conclude that investment 
liberalization stimulates exports when countries differ in relative skill endowments provided trade costs are not too 
high. 
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of industries allows us to investigate the role of ownership structure on the FDI-export/R&D 
nexus. Secondly, the removal of mandatory export and technology transfer requirements 
imposed on foreign firms affords us the opportunity to more precisely identify the causal effects 
of foreign acquisitions on export markets entry and technology take-off. 
It is well-documented that exports promotion and technology transfer are the two most 
important FDI policy objectives in China (Long, 2005). Macroeconomic figures would appear to 
suggest that the investment liberalisation process undergone by China in the run up to its 
accession to the WTO in 2001 were successful. By 2010, about 14 percent of global foreign 
direct investment flows went into the Chinese economy. China also accounted for roughly 10 
percent of world-wide exports in 2010, making it the world’s top exporter in that year (WTO, 
2011).  Over the same time, China has begun what Jefferson and Gao (2007) term its “science 
and technology (S&T) take-off”.  Data available from the World Development Indicators also 
show that, between 1996 and 2007, China increased its R&D expenditures from 0.5 to 1.4 
present of GDP – making it comparable to many industrialized countries. Investigating the 
causal effects of foreign ownership structure on export entry and technology take-off during this 
investment liberalization period is therefore not only of academic merit but also highly policy 
relevant. 
In order to evaluate the causal effects of foreign acquisitions on R&D and exporting, we  
implement a propensity score reweighting estimator (Hirano et al., 2003) combined with 
covariate adjustment, the so-called doubly-robust estimator (Bang and Robins, 2005). A major 
advantage of the doubly-robust estimator is that it provides correct identification even if either 
the propensity score or the conditional mean regression models are misspecified. The use of 
propensity score based methods - in most cases propensity score matching -  to infer the causal 
effects of foreign acquisitions is not new to the applied international economics literature [e.g. 
Girma and Görg (2007), and Arnold and  Javorcik (2009)]. However, to our knowledge this is 
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the first paper that combines propensity score weighing with covariate adjusted regressions, and 
thus exploits the opportunity this offers to obtain robust inference even under possible model 
misspecification.  
Besides identifying causal relationships using an empirical method most appropriate to the 
demands of the data, this paper addresses a number of important issues that have either been 
under- or unexplored in the existing literature. Firstly, we investigate the R&D and export 
decisions jointly. Thus far, the literature on the effects of foreign acquisitions has tended to 
concentrate on either technology or exporting.2 However, as Bustos (2011) and Hanley and 
Monreal-Perez (2012) show theoretically and empirically, technology upgrading (through 
investments in R&D or skills) and exports are likely to be related. Firms may either upgrade 
technology pre-export entry to improve quality or post-export entry through learning effects.  
Secondly, we look specifically at whether the degree of foreign ownership (or ownership 
structure) matters for technology upgrading and exports. This has, to the best of our knowledge, 
not received much attention in the literature. An exception is Thomas et al. (2008), who provide 
a descriptive analysis showing that foreign owners forming contractual agreements with local 
partners through joint ventures, equity joint ventures and joint stock enterprises are more 
successful in inducing new product developments than wholly owned firms. However, in their 
empirical approach they cannot claim to establish causal relationships.  Another related paper is 
Guadalupe et al. (2012), who investigate the link between foreign acquisition and innovation 
activity using firm level data for Spain. They also use a propensity score reweighting estimator, 
though not a doubly-robust estimator. Also, in contrast to our paper, they do not investigate 
whether ownership structure matters. 
                                           
2 For example, a number of papers employing propensity score matching show that foreign acquisitions lead to 
productivity increases (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009) where the implicit assumption is that technology improvements 
drive these increases in productivity, or foreign acquisition lead to more R&D activities in order to prevent the 
expansion of domestic rivals (Bandick, Görg and Karpaty, 2014).  A number of studies also look at the relationship 
between acquisitions and exporting, see, for example, Du and Girma (2009) using firm level data from China.   
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Thirdly, a distinctive feature of our paper is the focus on new export markets entrants and first 
time R&D investors. Prior exporting and R&D experience or lack thereof could be a sign of 
some unobserved firm level heterogeneity, and it can be empirically difficult to disentangle state-
dependence from acquisition effects. Thus focusing on changes in exporting and R&D status 
provides a cleaner identification strategy. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses investment liberalisation 
episodes in China and how these inform our study. Section 3 describes the firm level data we use 
and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology used. 
Section 5 discusses our main findings, and reports results from a number of sensitivity and 
robustness analyses. Some concluding comments are presented in Section 6.  
2. Institutional background  
We provide a brief description of the salient features of foreign investment liberalisation in 
China in order to show that China provides a very suitable test case to investigate the 
relationship between FDI, export entry and technology take-off. This will also help demonstrate 
how changes in FDI legislation resulting from investment liberalisation have informed the design 
of our econometric analysis.  
Prior to its accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s FDI policy was rather restrictive involving a 
cumbersome examination and approval system through which the government exerted control 
over the entry of foreign firms (Chen, 2011; Qin, 2007).  One of the most important guidelines 
for FDI and industrial government policy was the “Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign 
Investment” (Catalogue) which was issued in 1995 and then amended in the wake of China’s 
WTO entry in March 2002. It classified FDI in the industrial sectors as “encouraged”, 
“restricted”, “permitted”, or “prohibited” and imposed restrictions3 on foreign investment forms 
                                           
3 The restrictions imposed on foreign firms ranged from performance requirements to foreign equity share limits. 
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and shareholdings in certain key industrial sectors. The amendments increased the number of 
sectors open to foreign investment, allowed wholly foreign owned enterprises to join without 
having a Chinese partner. It also removed WTO-incompatible requirements on sectors such as 
requiring exporting a stipulated percentage of the goods produced within China (Wang, 2004). 
Following the investment liberalisation the catalogue increased the number of encouraged 
industries from 186 in 1997 to 262 in 2002, and reduced the number of restricted industries from 
112 in 1997 to 75 in 2002 (Qin, 2007). Meanwhile, the catalogue further liberalized the restriction 
on foreign investment shares, by reducing the provisions of “joint venture and joint 
cooperation” from 43 to 11, and reducing the provisions of “Shares Controlled by Chinese 
Party” from 44 to 32 (Chen and Shi, 2008).  
Encouraging investment to produce exports and promoting technology transfers have been two 
of the main emphases of China’s investment policy. According to the new Catalogue, China 
encouraged more FDI inflows into targeted sectors and industries, especially in export-oriented 
and high-technology industries. As discussed by Chen (2011) and Long (2005), the major 
changes in legislation on foreign investment in non-prohibited industries are (i) FDI may take 
the form of wholly foreign-owned enterprises or equity joint ventures with no restriction placed 
on foreign partners being the minority or majority shareholders (removing the stipulation that 
foreign parties are required to contribute at least 25 percent of total capital);  (ii) Mandatory 
export requirements imposed on wholly owned foreign firms and joint ventures were removed 
(they were required to export at least 70 per cent of their production). Under the amendments, 
each FDI firm is free to allocate sales of its products to either China’s domestic or its export 
market; (iii) The requirement for wholly-owned foreign firms to engage in technology transfer 
and establish R&D centres is also no longer in place. This makes it more attractive for foreign-
invested firms to invest in R&D in China. To encourage FDI in high-tech industries and to 
accelerate the pace of introducing advanced technologies from aboard, China also issued a 
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separate “Catalogue of Encouraged Hi-Tech products for foreign investment” that listed eleven 
types and 721 items where investment is encouraged to improve China’s technological base, 
including electronics and information, software, aeronautics and astronautics etc (Breslin, 2006).  
As discussed in section 1, technology upgrading through FDI investment could also be related to 
exports, which forms one of the main assumptions in our econometric estimation.  Indeed, in 
China promoting advanced technology and exporting are closely linked to each other. Advanced 
science and technology products have become the key to China expanding its exports after its 
accession to the WTO in 2001. For example, China’s industrial tariffs on IT products by 2005 
fell from the previous average of 13.3 percent, to zero. In 2006, IT products constituted over 10 
percent of China’s entire industry value added, and 37.6 percent of China’s export ratio (Chen 
and Shi, 2008). 
A noticeable effect of the exogenous (from the firms’ point of view) policy shift towards greater 
investment liberalisation is that wholly owned FDI enterprises have become the most popular 
form of FDI in China (Long, 2005). This indeed motivates our concern whether ownership 
structure mediates the FDI-export/R&D relationship.  
There are two plausible arguments as to how ownership structure should affect technology 
upgrading and exports. Firstly, one may expect that a higher foreign ownership share should lead 
to higher levels of investment in technology and skills. There is case study evidence by Mansfield 
and Romeo (1980) that multinational parent firms transfer more up-to-date technology to 
wholly-owned affiliates than to joint ventures. Also, econometric studies by Asiedu and Efahani 
(2001) and Javorcik and Saggi (2010) show that multinationals with the highest level of 
technology enter host countries via wholly owned affiliates rather than joint ventures. This 
higher use of technology may arguably translate into technology upgrading and higher export 
activity in the acquisition targets.  
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Secondly, however, one may also make a case that higher foreign ownership may be associated 
with lower technology and skill upgrading, if one assumes that there are different levels of 
technology gaps between purchaser and target depending on the level of foreign-ownership. If 
foreign owned firms tend to cherry pick the “best” targets for wholly-owned takeovers, then 
there may be only little need for technology upgrading as these firms are already operating close 
to the technology frontier. However, for partially-owned firms, which are initially operating using 
lower levels of technology, there would be a higher technology gap vis-a-vis the target and the 
purchaser, hence, a higher level of technology and skill upgrading would be possible after the 
acquisition. Another, less benevolent view, may be that foreign owners are more likely to 
integrate wholly-owned affiliates completely into their international production network, 
stripping the affiliate of its R&D activities and relocating it to the headquarters. This may be less 
likely if a Chinese partner is involved. The theoretical expectation is, therefore, ambiguous and 
needs to be decided by empirical evidence.  
It is precisely because hitherto existing restrictions on foreign ownership structure and 
mandatory export and technology transfer requirements had been lifted that we are better 
positioned to identify the causal effects of different forms of foreign acquisitions on export 
markets entry and technology take-off. 
3. Description of the dataset  
Our empirical analysis draws on a comprehensive firm level dataset, the Annual Reports of 
Industrial Enterprise Statistics, compiled by the China National Bureau of Statistics. The dataset 
covers all firms in China with an annual turnover of more than 5 million Yuan (about $800,000). 
These companies account for an estimated 85–90 percent of total output in most industries. The 
dataset includes information on the fraction of paid-in capital by foreign investors, R&D 
expenditure, employee training expenditure, export value, gross output, value added, wages, 
employment, ownership structure, industry affiliation, and geographic location, amongst other 
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variables. The data used in the analysis cover the period 2001 (China’s WTO entry year) to 2007 
(just before the onset of the global financial crisis) and comprises more than 1.3 million 
observations from about 446,000 firms.  
However, in view of the objective of this paper which is to identify the technology take-off and 
export markets entry effects of foreign acquisition following investment liberalization, our 
econometric analysis is confined to domestic firms which had no prior exporting and R&D in 
2001. Of those, we then define a “treatment group” as those firms that attracted foreign capital 
for the first time between 2002 and 2006. Those firms that remained in domestic hands during 
the observation period are our “control group”, again provided that they had no exporting and 
R&D activity prior to 2002. We also impose the condition that a firm has to be observed for at 
least three consecutive years in the sample. This leads us to an unbalanced panel of 27,513 firms. 
This panel data allows us to control for pre-acquisition characteristics and evaluate the post-
treatment effects on the year of acquisition and two periods following acquisition.  
We define a foreign acquisition in time t as a firm that has a zero foreign ownership share in t-1, 
and a positive share in t. Acquisitions with “high” foreign ownership shares may have different 
implications than acquisitions with “low” foreign involvement. Rather than distinguishing two 
categories of shared and full ownership, as e.g., in Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008), we consider 
four foreign ownership categories based on the share of capital paid in by the foreign investors. 
This allows us a finer distinction, by providing for possible differences between minority and 
majority foreign ownership categories.  
The first category comprises those acquired firms with a share of foreign capital lower than 25 
per cent (which we refer to as small minority foreign acquired firms). These are defined by the 
Chinese authorities as local firms, but with some level of foreign capital. The second category 
includes firms with a foreign share higher than or equal to 25 per cent but lower than 50 per 
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cent, which are considered foreign firms with minority foreign ownership. Our third category 
contains firms with a foreign share higher than or equal to 50 per cent but lower than 100 per 
cent, that is, foreign firms with majority foreign ownership. Finally, our last category comprises 
those fully (i.e., 100 percent) acquired firms.  
Table 1 gives the frequency distribution of foreign acquired firms in the sample by type of 
foreign acquisition and year. 1,509 firms (about 5.5 per cent of our sample of firms) received 
foreign capital for the first time between 2002 and 2006. Wholly owned foreign subsidiaries 
made up 34 per cent of total acquired firms during the observation period, foreign subsidiaries 
with majority foreign control accounted for 23 per cent, joint ventures with minority foreign 
participation represented 33 per cent and local firms that attracted low levels of foreign capital 
accounted for the remaining 10 per cent. 
For the acquired firms, our dataset also allows us to distinguish two types of investors: those 
Chinese companies investing from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao (which we refer to as ethnic 
Chinese investors) and those multinational firms investing from the rest of the world (which we 
call foreign MNEs). Our dataset also identifies the type of local partnership, namely private 
versus state-owned local partners.  
Table 1 also shows the distribution of acquired firms according to these characteristics4. The 
sample is fairly balanced between takeovers by ethnic Chinese investors and MNEs from other 
countries across most of foreign ownership categories. By contrast, foreign acquisitions with 
state-owned entities as local partners are more common amongst takeovers with higher foreign 
participation (while 43 percent of small minority foreign acquired firms involve state-owned 
                                           
4 The raw data also show that the foreign acquisitions exhibit considerable diversity across different industries. 
Detail is available upon request.  
 
11 
 
entities as local partners, this fraction increases to 52 and 66 percent amongst minority and 
majority acquisitions, respectively).  
[Table 1 here] 
Table 2 gives precise definitions of the main variables used in the analysis. These consist of the 
treatment variables (type of foreign acquisitions), the outcome variables (R&D and export 
market entry) and the pre-acquisition characteristics which are hypothesised to affect the 
likelihood of acquisition as will be discussed in the next section. 
[Table 2 here] 
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of exporting and R&D firms by foreign ownership structure 
(relative to domestic firms) in the year of acquisition and a year later. This preliminary graphical 
analysis shows a substantial gap between the proportion of domestic and foreign export firms. 
The gap is roughly proportional to the share of foreign capital, and increasing over time. By 
contrast, apart from small minority foreign firms, the difference between the proportion of 
domestic and foreign R&D firms is not that large and decreases with the share of foreign capital. 
This preliminary analysis suggests that acquired firms with higher levels of foreign ownership are 
more likely to experience larger export benefits. In contrasts, technological improvements seem 
to be more likely to occur amongst acquired firms with lower foreign control.  
Table 3 provides summary statistics of pre-acquisition characteristics by type of acquisition. 
Simple t-tests of equality of means reveal that future recipients of foreign capital were younger, 
larger, more productive, less leveraged, and paid higher wages compared to firms that remained 
domestically-owned5.  
[Table 3] 
                                           
5Full detail of the t-tests is omitted in the interest of saving space. Results are available upon request. 
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Overall, these descriptive statistics point out the necessity of adjusting for differences in 
observable characteristics in the treated and control groups in order to accurately identify our 
post-acquisition effects.  
4. Empirical methodology 
Recall that the chief research question is whether a hitherto non-exporting and non-R&D 
domestic firm is more likely to become an exporter and upgrade its technological capacity by 
undertaking R&D when it receives foreign capital. A second question is whether the degree of 
foreign ownership plays a role in stimulating these changes. Thus the main parameter of interest 
is the average treatment or causal effect of foreign acquisitions on the probability of exporting and 
engaging in R&D for the first time. The outcome variable of interest is therefore the change in 
exporting and R&D status between the pre- and post-acquisition periods, akin to using a 
difference-in-differences strategy.  
a. Basic setup  
As discussed in Section 3, we define one domestic ownership and four foreign ownership 
structures, which we denote as s=1,…,4, where: (1) s=1 if the foreign ownership share is less 
than 25 percent, (2) s=2 if the share of foreign ownership ranges from 25 to 49 percent, (3) s=3 
if the share of foreign capital is between 50 and 99 percent, and (4) s=4 if the firm is fully 
acquired (100 percent) by the foreign investor. In the presence of multiple treatments, the 
researcher can in theory consider any pairwise combination of the categories and estimate the 
desired treatment effects (e.g. Lechner, 2002). Consistent with the objective of this paper, we set 
domestic ownership as the control group (s=0) to construct the counterfactual outcome that the 
newly foreign-owned firms had remained in domestic hands. However, by way of further 
analysis, we will also report results from setting wholly foreign owned firms as the counterfactual 
group. 
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We define our foreign ownership treatment variable 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑠  (for each s=1,…,4) equal 1 if firm i that 
had been in domestic hands up to year t-1, is acquired at time t in foreign ownership category s; 
and 0 if it still remains domestically owned. Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝜏
𝑠  be the potential outcome under foreign 
ownership category s at time t+ ≥0. Also denote by 𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝜏
0  the potential outcome had the firm 
not received any foreign capital. For each firm, only one outcome is observed, the remaining 
four outcomes are counterfactuals. As mentioned before, in our empirical analysis these outcomes 
refer to the probability of observing a change in the firm’s R&D/exporting status between time t 
and t+. We evaluate the post-investment effects in the year of acquisition and two subsequent 
periods.  
To evaluate the average treatment effects of type-s foreign ownership, we need to estimate the 
difference between the mean outcome of all firms receiving foreign capital under foreign 
ownership s, and the mean outcome of the same group of firms had they not become foreign 
subsidiaries: 
𝜃𝑡+𝜏
𝑠 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝜏
𝑠 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝜏
0  ]                                                     [1] 
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that the quantity 𝑌𝑖𝑡+𝜏
0  is unobservable. That is, 
we cannot observe the technology and exporting status of foreign acquired firms had they not 
received FDI. Taking the mean outcome of all domestic firms as an approximation is 
inappropriate because it is most likely that firms’ characteristics that determine the equity 
position of the foreign investor also determine their future performance.  
In the microeconometric evaluation literature, selection on observables refers to the fact that the 
treatment and control group differ with respect to some measurable characteristics or 
confounders. Thus selection on observable makes a simple comparison of post-treatment 
outcomes of the two groups problematic. Two popular estimation strategies used to address this 
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problem are: (1) covariates/confounders adjusted regression where both the treatment and a 
saturated function of the confounders are included, and (2) variants of propensity-score 
matching, including inverse propensity score reweighting where subjects with higher ex ante 
probabilities are given less weight to control for selection bias6. As far as the former strategy is 
concerned, unbiased identification requires that the researcher specifies the regression equation 
correctly. On the other hand, an identification concern with inverse propensity score weighting is 
that all relevant confounders might not be included in the model used to estimate propensity 
scores.  
In this paper we identify the causal effects using the so-called doubly-robust estimator due to 
(Bang and Robins, 2005; Emsley et al, 2008)7. This estimator combines the propensity score 
reweighting estimator due to Hirano et al. (2003) 8  with covariates adjustment regression, 
including a flexible translog function of the covariates in the regression (also known as a 
saturated function). The doubly robust estimator derives its name from the fact that it provides 
two opportunities to adjust for selection on observables by combining inverse probability 
reweighting with regression covariates adjustment. The main advantage of doubly-robust 
estimators of causal effects is that by combining covariates adjusted regression with inverse 
probability weighting it offers the possibility of unbiased inference even under model 
misspecification as long as either the conditional mean regression or the propensity score models 
are correctly specified. 
An additional complication in our setup is the fact that the outcome variables are discrete and 
jointly determined, suggesting that a simple linear probability model is unlikely to be, at least in 
                                           
6  Some examples of the application of these methods in the international trade literature include Arnold and 
Javorcik (2009), Girma and Görg (2007), Görg et al. (2008) and Guadalupe et al. (2012).   
7 See also the Stata treatment-effects reference manual: Release 13, which can be accessed at  
http://www.stata.com/manuals13/te.pdf                          
8 Busso et.al (2009) show that propensity score reweighting estimators typically outperform propensity score 
matching estimators. It is worth noting that, strictly speaking, standard matching estimators wouldn’t be appropriate 
in this setting because of nonlinearity in the outcome variables. 
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theory, an adequate empirical tool. To deal with these features, we model the R&D and 
exporting decision jointly using inverse propensity score reweighted bivariate probit regressions 
which also include a saturated (translog) function of a host of pre-treatment characteristics. As 
mentioned before, this estimator is consistent when the parametric model for either the 
propensity score (an ordered logit model of foreign ownership structure in our case) or the 
regression function (bivariate probit in our case) is correctly specified. 
b. Doubly-robust regression  
We consider a series of covariance adjusted propensity-score re-weighted bivariate probit 
regressions of the joint decision to export and engage in R&D of the following general form: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡+𝜏 = 1) = 𝜙1[𝛽1 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑔(𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡+𝜏]                    [2a] 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝜏 = 1) = 𝜙2[𝛽2 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑔(𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡+𝜏]                    [2b] 
( 𝜀, 𝑢)  ~ 𝐵𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 [(
0
0
) , (
1 𝜌
𝜌 1
)]                                      [2𝑐] 
for s = 1, 2, 3 and 4, and with error correlation parameter . 
In the above equation  𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡+𝜏 (  𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝜏) is set to 1 if there is a change in the firm’s R&D 
(exporting) status between t-1 (pre-acquisition period) and t+, and to 0 otherwise; g(.) is the 
translog function which consists of the second order polynomial of the vector of pre-treatment 
covariates (X) and their full interactions (i.e. the saturated function).   
Because we are interested in average treatment effects (ATE) of foreign acquisition, the doubly 
robust estimator would require weighting treatment observations by 
1
𝑃𝑠
 and the counterfactual 
observations by 
1
1− 𝑃𝑠
 , where 𝑝𝑠 is the conditional probability of being acquired under type-s 
foreign ownership structure relative to remaining in domestic hands.  
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Since we are estimating a nonlinear probability model, neither 𝛼1nor 𝛼2 in the above model is 
equivalent to the average treatment effects of foreign acquisitions on the probability of R&D and 
exporting respectively9. To recover average treatment effects from bivariate probit estimates we 
need to perform further computations. We discuss the steps involved in these computations 
using the estimation of the average treatment effects of foreign acquisition on the probability of 
export markets entry as an example. 
(i) First, we estimate the determinants of foreign acquisition using an ordered logistic regression 
and from this we generate the relevant propensity score 𝑝𝑠 (see next sub-section for more detail 
on the propensity score estimation).  
(ii) Second, we estimate the propensity score-weighted bivariate probit regressions (equations 
2a-2c) with treated firms getting weight  
1
𝑝𝑠
  and non-treated firms getting weight  
1
1−𝑝𝑠
 . 
(iii) Based on the bivariate probit model estimates, we predict the potential probability of 
exporting under each treatment, ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑠 (i.e. setting 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = 1 for all observations, i=1, …N) and the 
same probability under the counterfactual case of no acquisition  ?̂?𝑖𝑡
0 (i.e. setting 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = 0 for all 
observations) : 
?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = 𝜙2[?̂?2 + ?̂?2 + ?̂?(𝑋𝑖𝑡−1)] and  ?̂?𝑖𝑡
0 = 𝜙2[?̂?2 + ?̂?(𝑋𝑖𝑡−1)]              [3] 
(iv)  Finally, we calculate the average treatment effect of acquisition on the probability of 
exporting as the average difference between the two potential outcomes:  
ATE = 
1
𝑁
∑ (?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑠 − ?̂?𝑖𝑡
0)𝑁𝑖=1                                                 [4] 
with standard errors made robust to industry and region clustering.  
c. Estimation of the propensity score 
                                           
9 For a discussion of how to estimate marginal treatment effects from bivariate probit regressions, see Nichols 
(2011) 
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We start by estimating an ordered logit model of foreign ownership structure based on the four 
categories of foreign ownership (s=1,...,4) and setting domestic ownership (s=0) as the base 
group. We follow Lechner (2002) and predict the corresponding probabilities (omitting firm and 
time indices) 𝜋𝑠 , s=0, …,4; and compute our propensity score relative to the base category as:  
𝑝𝑠 =
𝜋𝑠
𝜋𝑠+𝜋0
                                                                     [5] 
We model the probability of falling into each of the foreign ownership categories using an 
ordered logit specification conditional on g(X), where X is a vector of pre-acquisition covariates 
that are hypothesised to impact on the choice of foreign ownership structure, and g represents 
the translog function. In our empirical implementation, the vector of covariates X consists of 
firm size, age, wages productivity, SOE status and access to finance (leverage) and the full set of 
industry and time dummies10. The choice of these covariates is guided by the existing literature 
on the determinants of foreign acquisition [e.g. Harris and Robinson (2002); Conyon et al. (2002) 
and Girma and Görg (2007)]. Note that the inclusion of leverage in the vector of covariates is 
motivated by the argument that Chinese firms with limited access to domestic finance are likely 
to be foreign takeover targets (Huang, 2005). However, it is worth remembering that as in all 
propensity score based methods, the ultimate choice of covariates rests on the success of the 
ensuing balancing tests. 
The marginal effects from the ordered logit model of the determinants of the foreign ownership 
structure are reported in Appendix A.11 The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients 
are similar for all four types of ownership share. Our results are consistent with a large body of 
empirical work showing that foreign firms have strong preferences for the best performing firms 
(“cherry picking”). Thus, we find that younger, larger, more productive and higher wage (a 
                                           
10 The definition of these variables and their summary statistics are presented in Table 3.   
11 The estimated raw coefficients, including the interaction terms between the covariates, are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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possible proxy for skill composition) firms are more likely to be acquired by foreign investors. By 
contrast multinational firms are less inclined to buy into state-owned or highly leveraged firms. 
d. Common support and balancing conditions  
An important requirement for identifying causal treatment effects is the common support or 
overlap condition where the probability of being acquired under category s conditional on X is 
bounded between zero and one. We thus impose the common support condition to ensure that 
any combination of characteristics observed in the foreign acquired firms can also be replicated 
amongst domestic firms.  
In addition, to ensure that the propensity score is successful in controlling for firm differences in 
the pre-acquisition period we carry out a series of balancing test. To this end, for each control 
group and type-s acquired firms pairing, we divide the sample by propensity score quintile, and 
for each subsample we test for equality in means of the pre-treatment covariates between 
acquired and non-acquired firms. For the six covariates in X and the four acquisition types, this 
involves conducting equality of means tests in each of the five quintiles. In Appendix B, we 
report the results from these 120 balancing tests. It is reassuring that these tests demonstrate that 
the balancing conditions are satisfied.  
5.  Main findings and discussion 
5.1 Estimates from the baseline model  
Having established that conditional on the propensity score, acquired and non-acquired control 
goupr firms are comparable, we now present in Table 4 the doubly-robust logistic regression 
estimates of the causal effects of foreign acquisitions on the probability of R&D “take-off” and 
export markets entry. We show the effects in the year of acquisition, and within one year and 
two years of acquisition.  
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We begin by noting that during the year of acquisition, the effects of the foreign acquisition on 
the probability to engage in R&D are quite small. However, a stronger pattern emerges within 
one year of acquisition. Minority and small minority foreign ownership structures appear to be 
conducive to R&D take-off. For example minority foreign acquired firms are 7.4 percent more 
likely to undertake R&D than otherwise comparable firms that remained in domestic hands. By 
contrast wholly owned foreign firms are 2.7 percent less likely to receive R&D investment 
compared to their domestically owned peers. Although we have no direct evidence, we speculate 
that this pattern is consistent with the notion that the technology gap between the foreign 
acquirer and domestic target may play a role. The foreign acquirer may be engaging in joint 
ventures with local partners in firms where the level of technology is below the level of the 
acquirer. Hence, there is a strong potential for technology upgrading post-acquisition. For targets 
that are 100 percent taken over the technology gap between foreign acquirer and target may be 
relatively low, thus not necessitating strong efforts in technology upgrading.  
For small minority foreign acquired firms, these positive effects on R&D activity get stronger 
within two years of acquisition, though we have to caution that the longer the post-acquisition 
time horizon, the more difficult it might be to isolate the pure effects due to acquisition.  
In contrast to R&D, the FDI-induced causal effects on export markets entry are consistently 
positive and persistent across all ownership categories. For example, wholly acquired firms are 17 
percent more likely to start exporting within one year of acquisition than domestic firms. This 
effect is even more impressive at 20.2 percent for minority acquired firms12.  
[Table 4 here] 
5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
                                           
12 A simple t-test based on the reported standard errors rejects the null hypothesis of equality of means of 
coefficients.  
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Table 5 reports the causal effect estimates of foreign acquisitions on R&D and exports from a 
series of specifications designed to check the sensitivity of our baseline model. All reported 
results are based on outcomes within a year of acquisition. As mentioned before, focusing on a 
short time horizon allows us to better capture the pure effects due to acquisition. 
The first block of Table 5 gives estimates from covariate adjusted bivariate probit regressions 
without propensity score reweighting. This approach should deliver consistent estimators as long 
as the conditional mean model is correctly specified13. Overall we reach similar conclusions to 
the ones based on estimates from the doubly-robust models. Thus foreign takeovers 
unambiguously boost export performance in the acquired target, and its positive impact on R&D 
is confined to non-majority acquisitions. However, it would appear that unweighted regressions 
overestimate the beneficial effects of foreign ownership on exporting, especially for majority and 
whole acquisitions. This is perhaps not too surprising given that probability reweighing corrects 
for selection effects by assigning less weight to firms with a higher propensity to be acquired, and 
hence to export in the future. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the linear propensity score matching approach is not theoretically 
appropriate for non-linear models, we check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the 
estimator by employing a linear probability modelling framework where the decision to export 
and engage in R&D are jointly estimated using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
framework. The results from this experiment are shown in the second block of Table 5. It is 
reassuring to see that our conclusion that all types of foreign acquisitions are conducive to export 
markets entry remains intact. We also confirm that the beneficial effects of foreign acquisitions 
on R&D are confined to minority and small minority joint ventures.  
Are the results driven by export processing firms?  
                                           
13 Indeed using some simulation studies, Freedman and Berk (2008) conclude that “if investigators have a good 
causal model, it seems better just to fit the model without weights” (emphasis our own). 
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A legitimate question at this juncture is whether the positive causal effects of foreign acquisitions 
on exporting is driven by the possibility that MNEs might have used some of these firms to 
process imported intermediate inputs for exports. If this is indeed the case, our finding that FDI 
promotes exports market entry would have looked less impressive. We address this issue by re-
estimating our models without acquired firms that are chiefly used for processing intermediate 
inputs. We did so by first matching our firm level data with the transaction level data obtained 
from the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (see Manova and Yu, 2014). We managed to match a 
third of the exporting firms in our database to the customs dataset. This allows us to identify a 
significant proportion of firms that are engaged in processing trade, 246 of which are in the sub-
sample of the database used for this analysis. This low number can be explained by our research 
design which ruled out all firms with positive exports and foreign capital prior to investment 
liberalisation, precisely the type of firms that tend to have a high propensity to engage in export 
processing. For the purpose of our sensitivity analysis, we classify a firm as engaging in mainly 
export processing if processing exports account for more than half of total exports (processing 
exports + “ordinary” exports).  
The results from this exercise are reported in the third block of Table 5. The effects on R&D are 
largely as reported in Table 4. Also reassuringly we confirm that our findings of significant 
exporting effects due to foreign acquisitions are not driven by the presence of major export 
processing firms.  
Whole acquisition as the counterfactual 
Recall that in our baseline treatment effects model we set the counterfactual as being 
domestically owned, and that we found economically significant differentials in terms of the 
effects of foreign ownership on exporting and R&D. Our aim here is to check whether these 
differentials would persist under a different experimental setting. Accordingly, the last two 
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columns of Table 5 give the average treatment effects of being partially foreign acquired 
compared to the counterfactual of being wholly acquired. Consistent with the findings from our 
baseline model, we uncover evidence that non-wholly acquired firms have higher probabilities of 
undertaking R&D than would have been the case were they100 percent acquired. We also find 
that the probability of export markets entry is lower compared to the counterfactual scenario of 
100 percent foreign ownership. 
[Table 5 here] 
5.3 Is the source of FDI important? 
Next, we explore whether the effects of the foreign ownership structure is dependent on the 
geographic origin of FDI. For instance the technology gap between the acquirer and the target 
might vary with the origin of the foreign investor, and this might have discernible post-
acquisition implications. Our dataset allows us to distinguish between foreign acquirers of 
Chinese origin or “ethnic Chinese” (which account for nearly 53 percent of total acquirers) and 
foreign investors from the “rest of the world” (mainly from OECD countries).  
The results from this exercise (also based on the outcomes within a year of acquisition) are 
reported in Table 6. In line with our baseline results presented in Table 4, we show that both 
types of investors appear to contribute to the R&D take-off of small minority and minority 
acquired firms, and that neither source of FDI appears to increase the likelihood of R&D 
investment by wholly acquired firms. Interestingly, we uncover significant positive R&D effects 
on majority acquired firms by foreign MNE investors, while the negative effects are confined to 
those firms that are acquired by ethnic Chinese investors. As far as the magnitude of the export 
markets entry effects are concerned, these are much stronger for foreign MNE in all but the case 
of full acquisitions.  
[Table 6 about here] 
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5.4 Does the type of local partner matter? 
We also investigate whether the post-acquisition effects depend on the ownership status of the 
local partner, i.e., whether it is private or state-owned (SOE).14 There are two conflicting views 
on choosing SOE as local partners. One view argues that the performance of state owned firms 
remains unsatisfactory (e.g. Lin et al, 1998, Xu and Wang, 1999) due to the historical social 
legacy, for example, maintaining low levels of unemployment which often meant keeping 
unskilled labour. On the other hand, state partnerships might have a positive impact on 
performance because such foreign firms are politically well-connected and have better 
opportunities to receive government subsidies (Sun et al., 2002).  
As we report in Table 6, our analysis leads to the conclusion that the role of local partners on 
R&D appear to vary across ownership categories. Again, in line with our baseline results 
presented in Table 4, we find that FDI contributes to the R&D take-off of small minority and 
minority acquired firms regardless of whether the local partner is private or state-owned. A 
noteworthy result from this analysis is that majority foreign owned firms with private local 
partners are significantly more likely to engage in R&D, whereas majority foreign-owned firms 
with state-owned local partners continue to experience a lower likelihood of R&D investments. 
Regarding the export activity, our results confirm that there is a strong evidence of positive 
export markets entry effects for all types of foreign acquisitions regardless of the local partner.   
Interestingly, there is a stronger evidence to suggest that hitherto non-exporting state-owned 
firms enjoy a higher likelihood of entering international markets as a result of minority 
acquisitions by multinational firms. 
5.5 Further analysis 
                                           
14 Since we now only consider partnerships with local firms we, by definition, exclude wholly owned affiliates as this 
does not involve a local partner.   
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In our baseline model, we abstracted from the various well-documented econometric issues 
plaguing the estimation of TFP, and concentrated rather on value added per worker (which in 
any case is found to be highly correlated with TFP in most countries’ micro data15). However, to 
check our results further, in the first block of Table 7 we report the causal effects within one year 
of acquisition using TFP estimated following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). These results are 
reassuringly similar to the ones reported in Table 4. 
Accounting for possible spillovers 
The average treatment effects estimation framework we employed is underpinned by the 
fundamental assumption of the absence of significant spillovers from foreign to domestic firms, 
and indeed between foreign firms themselves16. This assumption is known as the stable-unit-
treatment-value assumption (SUTVA). It is of course quite possible that SUTVA does not hold 
in the data. In this case, (i) export and R&D spillovers from foreign to domestic firms may occur 
(e.g. Mayneris and Poncet, 2013), and (ii) the average impact of foreign acquisition may depend 
on the proportion of acquired firms within an industry or region (i.e. agglomeration effects).  
As far as foreign to domestic spillovers are concerned, we argue that this concern is greatly 
mitigated by the very nature of our experimental setting, namely the fact that we started with 
firms with no previous R&D and exporting experience. The scope for newly exporting or R&D-
investing foreign firms to transfer their knowledge to domestic firms is arguably limited, at least 
in the short post-acquisition period we are focusing on.  
In order to ascertain that our results are not affected by foreign to foreign cross-effects, we 
exploit the industrial and spatial dimensions in our data and control for the proportion of foreign 
acquired firms in the region and industry when calculating the average treatment effects given in 
                                           
15 Girma and Gong (2008) use the same Chinese firm level to estimate alternative measurements of TFP and also 
found the positive correlation between value added per work and TFP.   
16 We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging us to discuss this issue, and for generously suggesting some 
ideas. 
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Equation (4). The results from this exercise are reported in the second block of Table 7, and the 
pattern and magnitude of the effects are largely similar to those found earlier. However, this 
exercise also highlights the existence of potentially interesting exports agglomeration effects 
associated with non-minority foreign acquisitions. 
Exploring the sequence of R&D investment and exporting 
Do firms first engage in R&D or exporting? And what is the role of acquisition FDI in 
influencing the timing of this sequence? For the sake of brevity we do not fully explore the issue 
in this paper, as we think it is topic which merits to be analysed in its own right and perhaps with 
more detailed considerations. Nonetheless in the last two columns of Table 7 we report results 
from doubly robust regressions of the impact of FDI on the probabilities to engage in R&D first 
and exporting first. For the purpose of this experiment we define exporting (investing in R&D) 
first if firm exports (invest in R&D) for the first time anytime between t and t+2, where t is the 
period of acquisition. All other combinations are treated as the base group. The results suggest 
that acquisition FDI increases the likelihood of exporting first across the ownership structure 
spectrum. 
6. Conclusions 
In the run up to its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has undergone far-reaching investment 
liberalisation. In this paper we exploit the fact that as part of this investment liberalisation 
process, existing restrictions on foreign ownership structure and mandatory export and 
technology transfer requirements imposed on foreign firms had been lifted in a number of 
industries, to identify the causal effects of foreign acquisitions on export markets entry and 
technology take-off. Using doubly robust propensity score reweighted bivariate probit 
regressions to control for selection bias associated with foreign acquisition incidences, we 
uncover strong but heterogeneous positive effects on export activity for all types of foreign 
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ownership structure. We also find that minority foreign owned acquisition targets experience a 
higher likelihood of R&D.  
From a policy maker’s perspective, our results provide solid evidence that joint ventures between 
foreign owners and Chinese firms can contribute positively to China’s “science and technology 
take-off”. From an academic point of view, our work should inform future theoretical 
contributions as we have provided robust econometric evidence that foreign ownership structure 
matters for exporting and R&D decisions as an important source of firm heterogeneity.  
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Table 1 
Frequency distribution of sample firms by type of foreign acquisition 
 
 Total By local 
partners 
By  
FDI source   
By year 
  Private State Foreign Ethnic 
Chinese 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Small minority 
acquisition 
152 86 66 79 73 25 12 29 32 54 
Minority acquisition 497 240 257 245 252 89 53 96 112 147 
Majority acquisition 
 
349 118 231 174 175 69 54 67 66 93 
Wholly acquired 
 
511 n.a n.a 213 298 84 43 147 79 158 
Total 1509 444 554 711 798 267 162 339 289 452 
Note: The number of non-acquired domestic firms in the sample is 26,004. 
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Figure 1: Foreign ownership structure and the proportion of export and R&D firms:
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Table 2 
 Definition of main variables used in analysis 
Variable Definition 
Size  Log of total employment  
Productivity  Log of real value added per worker 
Wages Log of real wages per worker 
Leverage Total liability/total assets. 
Age  Log of firm age since incorporation 
State Owned Enterprise 
(SOEs) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state holds shares in the firm’s 
capital, 0 otherwise 
Research and 
Development  
Change dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm starts investing in 
R&D, and 0 otherwise 
Exports  Change dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm starts exporting, and 0 
otherwise 
Treatment variables 
(in all cases with no prior exporting or R&D experience) 
 
Small minority 
acquisition 
The share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign acquirer is 
positive but less than 25. 
Minority acquisition The share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign acquirers is 
greater than or equal to 25 percent but less than 50 percent. 
Majority acquisition  The share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign acquirers is 
greater than or equal to 50 percent but less than 100 percent. 
Wholly acquired  The share of the firm’s total capital owned by foreign acquirers is 
equal to 100 percent. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics of pre-acquisition characteristics by type of acquisition 
       
 Size Productivity Wages Age Leverage SOE 
Non-acquired       
Mean 4.626 3.846 6.928 2.065 2.547 0.0680 
Median 4.564 3.786 6.852 2.079 1.623 0 
St. deviation 0.907 1.150 0.985 0.940 2.536 0.252 
Observations 26,004 26,004 26,004 26,004 26,004 26,004 
Small minority acquisition       
Mean 5.214 4.027 7.610 1.906 2.524 0.0526 
Median 5.127 3.939 7.530 1.946 1.502 0 
St. deviation 1.189 1.263 1.293 0.965 2.573 0.224 
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 
Minority acquisition       
Mean 4.822 4.012 7.265 1.748 2.734 0.0423 
Median 4.718 3.928 7.185 1.792 1.651 0 
St. deviation 0.967 1.032 1.065 0.866 2.701 0.201 
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497 
Majority acquisition       
Mean 4.895 3.966 7.315 1.560 2.434 0.0430 
Median 4.828 3.803 7.288 1.609 1.491 0 
St. deviation 0.959 1.220 1.156 0.850 2.534 0.203 
Observations 349 349 349 349 349 349 
Whole acquisition       
Mean 4.792 3.847 7.152 1.437 2.209 0.0294 
Median 4.762 3.835 7.074 1.386 1.238 0 
St. deviation 0.969 1.097 1.066 0.863 2.460 0.169 
Observations 511 511 511 511 511 511 
Overall       
Mean 4.639 3.851 6.947 2.040 2.542 0.0664 
Median 4.575 3.790 6.873 2.079 1.613 0 
St. deviation 0.914 1.149 0.995 0.943 2.538 0.249 
Observations 27513 27513 27513 27513 27513 27513 
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Table 4:  
Average treatment effects from propensity-score weighted 
Doubly-robust regressions 
 Year of  
acquisition 
Within one year of 
acquisition  
Within two years of 
Acquisition 
Acquisition type R&D Export R&D Export R&D Export 
Small minority -0.011*** 0.113*** 0.074*** 0.106*** 0.289*** 0.138*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0049) (0.0018) 
Observations 24,907 24,907 24,816 24,816 24,728 24,728 
       
Minority 0.014*** 0.076*** 0.049*** 0.202*** 0.036*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0041) (0.0004) (0.0028) 
Observations 25,666 25,666 25,570 25,570 25,391 25,391 
       
Majority 0.004*** 0.037*** -0.003*** 0.062*** 0.015*** 0.074*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0008) 
Observations 25,902 25,902 25,801 25,801 25,666 25,666 
       
Whole -0.007*** 0.084*** -0.027*** 0.170*** -0.034*** 0.161*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0017) 
Observations 22,980 22,980 22,889 22,889 22,746 22,746 
  
Notes:  
(i) Fully saturated of the pre-acquisition characteristic and industry-time dummy are included in 
the regression. 
(ii) The counterfactual is being domestically owned. 
(iii) Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
(iv) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5:  
Sensitivity analysis 
 Covariate 
adjusted only 
without 
reweighting  
 
Linear 
probability  
model 
Excluding 
major exports 
processing firms 
Wholly acquired 
vs. 
partially 
acquired firms 
Acquisition 
type 
R&D Export R&D Export R&D Export R&D Export 
Small minority 0.044*** 0.131*** 0.069*** 0.135*** 0.074*** 0.106*** 0.049*** -0.099*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.024) (0.027) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 24,816 24,816 24,816 24,816 24,800 24,800 657 657 
         
Minority 0.054*** 0.139*** 0.070*** 0.141*** 0.049*** 0.203*** 0.088*** -0.095*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Observations 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,553 25,553 998 998 
         
Majority -0.008*** 0.188*** -0.010 0.202*** -0.002*** 0.062*** 0.015*** -0.034*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 25,801 25,801 25,801 25,801 25,777 25,777 846 846 
         
Whole -0.010*** 0.276*** -0.011 0.288*** -0.028*** 0.161*** n.a. n.a. 
 (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.001) (0.002)   
Observations 22,889 22,889 22,889 22,889 22,852 22,852   
 
 Notes:  
(i) All results based on outcome within one year of acquisition. 
(ii) Fully saturated of the pre-acquisition characteristic and industry-time dummy are included in 
the regressions.  
(iii) Results in the last four columns are based on doubly robust propensity score reweighted 
bivariate probit estimation.  
(iv) The last two columns give average treatment effects of being partially foreign acquired 
compared to counterfactual of being wholly acquired. In all other cases, the counterfactual is 
being domestically owned. 
(v) Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
(vi) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
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Table 6: 
The role of local partnership and source of FDI 
 Ethnic Chinese vs. Foreign MNE 
acquisitions 
Private vs. state-owned  
local partners 
 R&D Exporting R&D Exporting 
Acquisition type Ethnic 
Chinese 
Foreign Ethnic 
Chinese 
Foreign Private State Private State 
Small minority 0.040*** 0.097*** -0.038*** 0.228*** 0.043*** 0.107*** 0.024*** 0.203*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Observations 24,816 24,816 24,816 24,816 24,816 24,816 24,816 24,816 
         
Minority 0.074*** 0.030*** 0.172*** 0.228*** 0.095*** 0.006*** 0.164*** 0.251*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) 
Observations 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 25,570 
         
Majority -0.008*** 0.006*** 0.033*** 0.102*** 0.007*** -0.008*** 0.089*** 0.047*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 25,801 25,801 25,801 25,801 25,801 25,801 25,801 25,801 
         
Whole -0.017*** -0.041*** 0.176*** 0.166*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)     
Observations 22,889 22,889 22,889 22,889     
Notes:  
(i) All results based on outcome within one year of acquisition. 
(ii) Fully saturated of the pre-acquisition characteristic and industry-time dummy are included in 
the regression (see Equation 2 in the text for detail). 
(iii) The counterfactual is being domestically owned. 
(iv) Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
(v) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7 
Further analysis 
 With sales based 
TFP measure 
of productivity  
 
With industry-region 
proportion of 
acquired firms 
 
Exploring the sequence of 
R&D 
and exporting  
 
Acquisition type R&D Exporting R&D Exporting R&D first vs. 
all other 
combinations 
 
Exports first 
vs. all other 
combinations 
 
Small minority 0.073*** 0.110*** 0.074*** 0.107*** -0.201*** 0.071*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
PROP   0.011 -0.024   
   (0.023) (0.020)   
Observations 24,816 24,816 24,816 24,816 24,907 24,907 
       
Minority 0.067*** 0.211*** 0.049*** 0.200*** -0.210*** 0.186*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
PROP   -0.0001 0.046   
   (0.008) (0.052)   
Observations 25,526 25,526 25,570 25,570 25,666 25,666 
       
Majority 0.004*** 0.057*** -0.002*** 0.060*** -0.054*** 0.046*** 
 (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PROP   -0.001** 0.046***   
   (0.001) (0.013)   
Observations 25,755 25,755 25,801 25,801 25,902 25,902 
       
Whole -0.021*** 0.163*** -0.027*** 0.166*** -0.141*** 0.160*** 
 (0.0001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
PROP   -0.013 0.072**   
   (0.008) (0.029)   
Observations 22,849 22,849 22,889 22,889 22,980 22,980 
 
Notes:  
(i) All results are based on outcome within one year of acquisition. 
(ii) PROP refers to the proportion of other foreign acquired firms in a firm’s industry-region; 
a term designed to capture potential spillovers amongst acquired firms. 
(iii) Fully saturated of the pre-acquisition characteristic and industry-time dummy are included 
in the regression. 
(iv) The control group consists of domestic firms 
(v) Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
(vi) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix A 
Determinants of foreign acquisition structure: 
Average marginal effects from the ordered logit model 
 Foreign acquisition type 
     
 Small 
 minority 
 
Minority Majority Whole 
Size 0.00008 0.00025 0.00015 0.00009 
 (0.00027) (0.00081) (0.00052) (0.00088) 
Productivity 0.00091*** 0.00274*** 0.00173*** 0.00277*** 
 (0.00015) (0.00042) (0.00028) (0.00045) 
Wage 0.00129*** 0.00389*** 0.00246*** 0.00417*** 
 (0.00025) (0.00073) (0.00047) (0.00077) 
Age -0.00241*** -0.00732*** -0.00465*** -0.00765*** 
 (0.00023) (0.00050) (0.00037) (0.00057) 
Leverage -0.00029*** -0.00087*** -0.00056*** -0.00093*** 
 (0.00011) (0.00031) (0.00020) (0.00034) 
SOE  -0.00141* -0.00429* -0.00273* -0.00449* 
 (0.00076) (0.00230) (0.00149) (0.00271) 
Observations 27,513 27,513 27,513 27,513 
  
Notes: 
(i) Industry-year effects are controlled for in all regressions. 
 (ii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Balancing tests for differences in observed pre-treatment characteristics 
Domestic versus small minority acquisition firms 
       
Propensity score 
quintile 
SIZE PROD WAGE AGE LEVERAGE SOE 
1 -0.0531 -0.0822 -0.1278 -0.1076 -0.1351 0.0110 
 (0.223) (0.254) (0.239) (0.149) (0.616) (0.054) 
2 0.1430 -0.3068 0.4372 0.1940 0.3885 -0.0383 
 (0.298) (0.339) (0.319) (0.199) (0.823) (0.072) 
3 0.0568 -0.1134 0.2192 -0.0247 0.3480 0.0642 
 (0.294) (0.335) (0.315) (0.197) (0.812) (0.071) 
4 -0.0399 0.0417 0.0914 0.0613 0.1279 -0.0085 
 (0.258) (0.293) (0.276) (0.173) (0.712) (0.062) 
5 0.0576 0.2084 0.0403 -0.0039 -0.4864 -0.0675 
 (0.228) (0.260) (0.245) (0.153) (0.631) (0.055) 
Observations 24,907 24,907 24,907 24,907 24,907 24,907 
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(Appendix B continued)  
Domestic versus minority acquisition firms 
Propensity score 
quintile 
SIZE PROD WAGE AGE LEVERAGE SOE 
1 -0.1451 -0.0316 -0.0658 0.0281 -1.4013 -0.1117 
 (0.383) (0.427) (0.409) (0.259) (1.097) (0.115) 
2 0.0295 -0.3235 0.1658 -0.2485 0.4773 0.1936 
 (0.501) (0.558) (0.535) (0.339) (1.435) (0.150) 
3 0.5745 -0.2241 0.6728 0.0459 3.1462* 0.0467 
 (0.430) (0.479) (0.459) (0.291) (1.232) (0.129) 
4 0.2327 -0.1157 0.2496 0.1723 1.6445 0.1026 
 (0.404) (0.450) (0.432) (0.273) (1.157) (0.121) 
5 0.1993 0.2154 0.1512 0.0505 1.2851 0.1023 
 (0.387) (0.432) (0.414) (0.262) (1.109) (0.116) 
Observations 25,666 25,666 25,666 25,666    25,666 25,666 
    
Domestic versus majority acquisition firms 
       
Propensity score 
quintile 
SIZE PROD WAGE AGE LEVERAGE SOE 
1 -0.0512 0.0502 0.0638 -0.0287 0.3245 -0.0796 
 (0.215) (0.238) (0.229) (0.143) (0.607) (0.060) 
2 0.0600 0.0535 0.0557 0.0941 -0.3535 0.1029 
 (0.266) (0.294) (0.284) (0.177) (0.751) (0.074) 
3 0.3922 -0.2916 0.3326 0.2118 -0.1724 0.0741 
 (0.272) (0.301) (0.291) (0.181) (0.770) (0.076) 
4 0.1293 -0.0625 0.0534 0.1884 0.2460 0.0782 
 (0.238) (0.263) (0.254) (0.158) (0.672) (0.066) 
5 0.0405 0.0630 -0.0183 -0.0527 0.2918 0.0973 
 (0.222) (0.245) (0.237) (0.147) (0.626) (0.062) 
Observations 25,902 25,902 25,902 25,902 25,902 25,902 
 
Domestic versus wholly-acquired firms 
Propensity score 
quintile 
SIZE PROD WAGE AGE LEVERAGE SOE 
1 0.1701 0.1659 0.1723 0.3036 0.4017 0.1368 
 (0.384) (0.427) (0.412) (0.255) (1.086) (0.101) 
2 -0.1829 0.1011 -0.4089 -0.4046 -0.3034 -0.1755 
 (0.543) (0.603) (0.582) (0.360) (1.534) (0.143) 
3 -0.1492 -0.2715 -0.1422 -0.0225 -1.2473 -0.0464 
 (0.502) (0.557) (0.538) (0.333) (1.419) (0.132) 
4 0.0434 0.1442 0.1326 0.0874 -0.6653 -0.1263 
 (0.433) (0.481) (0.464) (0.287) (1.223) (0.114) 
5 0.3044 -0.1407 0.2130 -0.0360 -0.0842 -0.1700 
 (0.397) (0.440) (0.425) (0.263) (1.121) (0.104) 
Observations 22,980 22,980 22,980 22,980 22,980 22,980 
 
